

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01387 061856Z

67

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01

DRC-01 ( ISO ) W

----- 053966

R 061045Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5273

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01387 061856Z

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
USLO PEKING  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY  
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMCONSUL MADRAS  
CINCPAC  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
CINCLANTFLT  
COMIDEASTFOR

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 1387

E.O.11642: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR MARR PARM US XO TZ  
SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN

REF: NEW DELHI 5616; BANGKOK 7092; NAIROBI 3635

1. SUMMARY: PUBLIC DEBATE OR STATEMENT ON US INDIAN OCEAN (IO) POLICY WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO US IN TANZANIA. IT WOULD BE SALUTORY, HOWEVER, IF WE COULD TELL TANZANIANS PRIVATELY THAT WE INTEND TO ASK RUSSIANS TO DISCUSS MUTUAL REDUCTION NAVAL FORCES IN IO. END SUMMARY.

2. WE SHARE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHALL OVER IMPLICATIONS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING TANZANIA, OF PUBLIC DEBATE OR STATEMENT ON US INDIAN OCEAN POLICY. ALTHOUGH WE AGREE THERE IS NEED TO DEFINE US INTERESTS IN AREA, THE LESS SAID PUBLICLY ON THIS QUESTION THE FEWER PROBLEMS WILL BE RAISED FOR US IN TANZANIA.

3. UNLIKE KENYA, TANZANIA DOES NOT PERMIT US NAVAL VESSELS, NOR THOSE FROM ANY OTHER NON-LITTORAL COUNTRY, TO USE PORT OF DAR ES SALAAM. NOR DOES TANZANIA, EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, ACCEPT US PRESENCE AS DESIRABLE OFFSET TO SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN. ON OTHER HAND, AS LONG AS  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 01387 061856Z

US NAVAL PRESENCE IS OFF FRONT PAGE, TANGOV TENDS TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER MATTERS. SHOULD WE MAKE MAJOR ISSUE OF OUR INDIAN OCEAN POLICY, TANGOV WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE BALL AGAIN AND RUN WITH IT.

4. AS INDICATED IN AMBASSADOR CARTER'S LAST DISCUSSION INDIAN OCEAN MATTERS WITH FONMIN MALECELA (DAR 423 NOTAL), TANGOV FEELS OBLIGED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT US NAVAL ACTIVITIES (BASING AND

DEPLOYMENT) IN INDIAN OCEAN BECAUSE US FRANKLY ANNOUNCES THESE ACTIVITIES AND TANZANIA IS COMMITTED TO CONCEPT OF INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE (IOZP). USSR, ON OTHER HAND, DOES NOT RPT NOT ANNOUNCE ITS NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN IO AND TANZANIA HAS REAL DIFFICULTY FINDING OUT INDEPENDENTLY WHAT RUSSIANS ARE UP TO. (WE ARE NOT MANGUINE, HOWEVER, THAT IF USSR DID PUBLISH CALLS IN IO OF THEIR NAVAL VESSELS, TANGOV WOULD IN FACT BE AS CRITICAL OF THEM AS OF US.) MALECELA MADE CONSIDERED REQUEST HIS GOVERNMENT THAT REDUCTION US AND USSR NAVAL FORCES IN IO BE INCLUDED AS ITEM IN ONGOING US-USSR DETENTE TALKS. DISCUSSION IN THIS FORUM, MALECELA ARGUED, WOULD REMOVE THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE FROM CONTEXT IN WHICH TANZANIA PUT IN POSITION OF HAVING TO BE MORE CRITICAL OF US ACTIVITIES THAN THOSE USSR. IT WOULD ALSO OFFER PROSPECT OF REDUCTION US-USSR NAVAL FORCES IN IO AND THEREBY BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD TOWARDS TANGOV GOAL OF REALIZATION OF IOZP.

5. CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT, WE HAVE BEEN PUZZLED, FRANKLY, WHY TANGOV HAS NOT PUBLICLY ATTACKED US NAVAL VISITS TO MOMBASA. DURING LAST TWO MAJOR US NAVAL VISITS TO MOMBASA, BOTH OF WHICH INCLUDED AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THERE WAS NOT ONE WORD OF CRITICISM, EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, IN TANZANIA. TANGOV HAS NOT HESITATED TO PUBLICLY ATTACK NEIGHBORS IF IT FELT THEY ACTING IN MORALLY REPREHENSIBLE FASHION, E.G. UGANDA AND BURUNDI IN PAST FEW YEARS. WHY THE HESITANCY WITH KENYA ON THIS ISSUE? WE DO NOT KNOW, BUT WE BELIEVE TANZANIA'S TOLERANCE IN THIS AREA IS VERY LIMITED. WE WORRY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INCREASED US NAVAL VISITS TO MOMBASA MAY STRETCH THAT TOLERANCE TO BREAKING POINT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, IN OUR VIEW TOO, THAT THERE IS A BETTER CHANCE OF HAVING TANZANIA CONTINUE TIS UNEXPLAINED SILENCE CONCERNING VISITS BY US NAVAL SHIPS TO MOMBASA IF US KEEPS ITS PROFILE LOW AND AVOIDS ANY PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF VISITS. WE BELIEVE PUBLIC DEBATE OF IOZP WOULD LEAD TO TANGOV REVIEW OF US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN IO AND THEN SPECIFICALLY TO CONSIDERATION OF  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 DAR ES 01387 061856Z

US NAVAL VISITS TO KENYA. TANGOV COULD BE EXPECTED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES TO PUBLICLY CONDEMN THOSE VISITS WHICH WOULD, IN TURN, PUT INCREASING PRESSURE ON KENYA TO REDUCE OR EVEN TERMINATE THE VISITS.

6. CONCERNING BASING, OR SPECIFICALLY CONSTRUCTION MILITARY FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA, WE BELIEVE THAT IF SUCH CONSTRUCTION COULD PROCEED WITH LESS FANFARE, TANGOV MIGHT ALSO NOT FEEL IMPERATIVE TO BE PUBLICLY CRITICAL. THERE SEEMS NO WAY OF KEEPING DIEGO GARCIA CONSTRUCTION DISCREET, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE NOTED THAT VERY EXISTENCE THESE FACILITIES IS BECOMING A PERMANENT IRRITATION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH TANZANIA (DAR ES SALAAM 329 NOTAL). THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT SHOULD CONGRESS APPROVE FULL EXPANSION PLANS FOR DIEGO GARCIA, TANGOV AND PERHAPS

OTHER IO LITTORAL STATES WILL TAKE THAT DECISION AS THEIR CUE TO ATTACK MORE CONSISTENTLY AND PUBLICLY US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS, TO SUCH PORTS AS MOMBASA, AS WELL AS DIEGO GARCIA CONSTRUCTION ITSELF.

7. WE ARE ASKED QUESTIONS RAISED NEW DELHI 5616, PARA TWO, BY TANZANIANS AND HAVE AS MUCH DIFFICULTY AS AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN IN PROVIDING ANSWERS. IT WOULD HELP IF WE KNEW ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS, BUT WE TEND TO AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR MARSHALL THAT IF ANSWERS ARE BASED PRIMARILY ON US SECURITY, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERSUASIVE TO TANZANIANS.

8. WHAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US IS IF WE COULD PRIVATELY INFORM TANGOV THAT WE HAVE ASKED USSR TO DISCUSS REDUCTION NAVAL FORCES IN IO. SOVIETS WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO EXPLAIN TO COUNTRY LIKE TANZANIA REASONS FOR REFUSING TO TAKE PART IN SUCH TALKS. WHEN APPROPRIATE, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD TELL TANGOV THAT CONSTRUCTION ON DIEGO GARCIA WOULD GO FORWARD CONCOMITANTLY, NOTING COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA NEEDED AND NOT RELATED TO NUMBER OF NAVAL SHIPS DEPLOYED IN IO. ALSO, WE SHOULD COMMENT THAT IT HAS BE US EXPERIENCE FOR PAST 30 YEARS THAT USSR ONLY REACTS CONSTRUCTIVELY IN NEGOTIATIONS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH VISIBLE, EVIDENT COUNTERFORCE. THESE POINTS CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION OF DIEGO GARCIA ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE TOTALLY CONVINCING HERE, BUT THEY MAY BE ENOUGH TO BLUNT ANY CONTENTIOUS TANGOV REACTION. AS LONG AS TANZANIANS ARE UNWILLING TO GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO US SECURITY  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 DAR ES 01387 061856Z

CONCERNS, WE CAN DISCOVER NO CINSISTENT SCENARIO WHICH WOULD BE PERSUASIVE IN THIS SITUATION. SHOULD U.S. OFFER TO TALK TO RUSSIANS, TANGOV (AND OTHER IO LITTORALS) COULD AT LEAST CLAIM PARTIAL VICTORY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE IN DAR ES SALAAM, WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY LIMITED, IT WOULD SEEM US HAS MORE TO GAIN FROM SUCH TALKS THAN RUSSIANS.  
BEYER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NAVAL FORCES, MILITARY POLICIES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY VISITS, MILITARY BASES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 MAY 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974DARES01387  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740109-0478  
**From:** DAR ES SALAAM  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740572/aaaacmqq.tel  
**Line Count:** 208  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** NEW DELHI 5616; BANGKOK 7092; NAIROB, I 3635  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <04 FEB 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US POLICY TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MARR, PARM, US, XO, TZ, UR, IO  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005